Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1978

Child, Family And State: Problems And Materials On ChildrenAnd
The Law
Henry McGee

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Henry McGee, Child, Family And State: Problems And Materials On ChildrenAnd The Law, 66 CAL. L. REV.
1343 (1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/510

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Seattle University School
of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:

A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, by Rob-

ert H. Bork. New York: Basic Books, 1978. Pp. xi, 462. $18.00.

Reviewed by Wesley . Liebelert
Professor Bork writes in preface that the first draft of this book was
completed in 1969. Its appearance was delayed by a series of unexpected events including campus unrest and his appointment as United
States Solicitor General. That delay was unfortunate; more of the
book's message would have been news to the antitrust student in 1971
than it is in 1978. Aside from discussion of Oliver Williamson's work
on antitrust theory, a chapter on barriers to entry, one on predation
through government processes, and a brief discussion of oligopoly,
there is not a great deal in the book that was not developed or at least
implicit in work that Bork had completed by 1966.' In addition, the
book suffers from the author's impatience with competing theorists.
Bork often leaves the impression that he believes anyone who disagrees
with him to be either not in his right mind or so mentally crippled that
he should be committed to teaching antitrust at Columbia University.
While some of this is pardonable as sport to enliven an otherwise drab
calling, Bork has let the matter get out of hand.
This is not to say, however, that the book is not head and shoulders above most other work that passes for antitrust analysis. Despite
stylistic problems and the fact that portions of the book are dated, there
is no work of comparable quality in the field, except for Richard Posner's Antitrust Law. 2
Having both damned and praised in general terms, I turn to specifics. Bork views antitrust law primarily from an economic perspective.
While others might disagree with this approach, I do not. From an
economic standpoint, the goal of antitrust law is to balance allocative
efficiency and productive efficiency in an attempt to maximize the total
wealth of society. As I have put it elsewhere, "[A]ntitrust should permit
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1953, Macalester College;
J.D. 1957, University of Chicago.
1. See Bork, The Rule ofReason and the PerSe Concept: PriceFixingandMarket Division
(pts. 1-2), 74-75 YALE L.J. 775, 373 (1965-1966).
2.

R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
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maximization of the sum of consumer and producer surplus."3
It would be easy to balance the allocative efficiency and the productive efficiency effects of various transactions if we could generate
information for the economic models as easily as it is done in the model
of perfect competition-simply by assuming it. Since information is
costly in the real world, however, we must develop proxies or general
rules, formed with the guidance of economic analysis, that seem likely
to produce more good than harm as the law is applied to various kinds
of business arrangements. The main thrust of Bork's book is to develop
and justify a set of such proxies. To do this he discusses the legislative
history of the Sherman Act and examines the role and capabilities of
the institutions that decide antitrust cases. He then develops an economic analysis of antitrust and applies it to a wide range of different
types of transactions and arrangements that make up the main grist for
the antitrust mill.
I basically agree with Bork's approach, with most of his analysis,
and with the main body of his conclusions. Perhaps one should not
review a book with which he is in such basic agreement. I proceed,
nonetheless, by attempting to extend Bork's basic analysis in certain
areas, criticizing it with moderation in others, and by suggesting some
different ways of looking at some of the issues and cases that he did
discuss.
I
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY

In developing his proxies for the costly and largely unavailable
information needed to balance allocative and productive efficiency,
Bork argues that all transactions that do not seem capable of restricting
output (decreasing allocative efficiency) should be left alone, without
regard to whether they seem capable of creating or increasing productive efficiency. 4 While he believes that it is possible and desirable to go
further and specify the nature of the productive efficiencies created or
intended by various business activities, Bork argues that it is not logically necessary to do so.
Even though it is technically correct, I have two problems with this
general approach. The first relates to the doctrine of ancillary restraints; the second, to the usefulness of asking questions about productive efficiency. First, Bork's approach does not at all describe the law
of ancillary restraints, the principal means by which the law distin3. Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in Concentrated Markets, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1231, 1231 (1978).
4. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 122 (1978).
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guishes arrangements that should be subjected to the per se rule from
those to be governed by the rule of reason. That doctrine, of which
Bork in other places thoroughly approves,5 looks first to the efficiencycreating potential of an arrangement. It does this by asking if there is a
main, legitimate purpose to the agreement to which the elimination of
competition may be ancillary. If there is no such efficiency-creating
potential the per se rule will be applied, whether or not output restriction is possible.
It is usually not much justification for an antitrust rule to state that
it is, in fact, the law, but that is not true for the ancillary restraints
doctrine. Bork seems to agree that, properly understood and sensitively
applied, the doctrine seems adequate to make economic sense out of
the antitrust law. In spite of this early argument that all arrangements
that seem incapable of restricting output should be left alone, he does
not propose changes in the basic structure of the ancillary restraints
doctrine or the per se rule.
My second problem is that Bork's suggested approach does not
focus sufficient attention on productive efficiency. In part this is simply
a question of tactics: One is likely to be more successful in convincing
another that a particular arrangement is not output restricting if he can
plausibly suggest how it enhances efficiency. But the problem cuts
deeper. Economists and antitrust enforcement officials are notoriously
clever at finding monopoly explanations for almost every business arrangement that is even slightly out of the ordinary.6 This propensity
and ability goes a long way toward explaining the present unsatisfactory state of the law. As a result, too little attention has been given to
the question of how these "odd looking" arrangements may create or
increase efficiency. Anything that would increase that attention would
be welcome.7
The results of inquiring into the efficiency-creating potential of
challenged arrangements sometimes can be startling. Take, for example, the leasing arrangements in United States v. UnitedShoe Machinery

Corp.8 Although Bork correctly criticizes Judge Wyzanski (who was
assisted in that case by a certified economist) for not examining the

5. See, e.g., id.
6. See Coase, IndustrialOrganization A ProposalforResearch, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972). Elsewhere, I
have called this propensity to believe monopoly ubiquitous as the "Coase Syndrome." Liebeler,
supra note 3, at 1281.
7. 1 have argued that in evaluating so-called predatory or exclusionary practices the antitrust enforcement agencies should make, at least within the agency itself, the strongest argument
possible that such practices are efficiency-creating. If that argument can then be refuted, action
against the practices may be appropriate. Id. at 1282.
8. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'dpercuriam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
1
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possibility that United's leasing system was efficiency-creating, 9 Bork is
almost equally guilty. He spills considerable ink to convince us that the
leasing and other arrangements used by United were not predatory,
exclusionary, or otherwise output restricting in nature,' 0 but he never
addresses the basic question of what efficiencies United was trying to
achieve by leasing rather than selling its shoe manufacturing machines.
In this respect UnitedShoe seems to be quite like United States v.
American Can Co.I 1 There the government attacked below-cost leases
of can-closing machines that had been tied to requirements contracts
for cans. The court required the can producers to limit the requirements contracts to one year and to offer the closing machines for sale at
attractive prices. The supposed purpose was to rid the market of foreclosure-the same problem perceived in United's machine leases-and
thereby increase economic welfare.
The American Can arrangements seem designed to create efficiency, however, by shifting risk from the packers to the can producers.
One risk shifted is that of bearing the capital cost of an expensive can
closing machine in a season of short crops, when it will be little used. If
payment for the machine is through the purchase of cans, lower payments will be made in a lean year. Payments will be made up when
crops are good and many cans are bought. The can producers appear
to be able to deal with the risk of crop fluctuations more cheaply than
individual packers because the former typically will cover wider geographic areas and broader crop lines than the latter. The diversity in
yields as between different areas and different crops makes this "insurance" scheme feasible to the can producers. As we shall see below, the
same type of scheme may have been involved in the United Shoe
leases.
The American Can analysis produces at least two testable propositions. First, we would not expect the leasing arrangements to be used
in selling cans to those industries in which demand was more predictable and closing machines were used on a relatively steady basis. The
risks involved in fluctuating use would not be present. This, in fact, appears to have been the case. Sales of cans to industries such as beer,
petroleum products, and dog food did not involve a lease of the closing
machines tied to requirements contracts for cans.12
9.

R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 138, 171.

10. Id. at 138-41, 170-73, 325-28.
11. 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
12. See D. Flath, UnitedStates v.American Can Company Economic Analysis of an Antitrust Case (unpublished doctoral dissertaion on file with the UCLA Economics Department). My
analysis of American Can in terms of risk shifting is not original. See United States v. American
Can Co., 230 F. 859, 896 (D. Md. 1916), appealdismissed,256 U.S. 706 (1921); 2 S. WHITNEY,
ANTrRuST POLICIES 202 (1958). See also Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing,55 Nw. U.L.
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The second testable proposition generated by this analysis is that
the smaller packers, the ones least able to handle the risk described,
would be quite unhappy with the result of American Can. In fact,
within a few years after the decree those smaller firms were complaining that the requirement of the decree that machine rentals be
fully compensatory was driving them out of business. The court remarked in ContinentalCan, rather plaintively I would like to believe,
that it "never intended to work an unconscionable or oppressive condition on any class of canner, large or small, particularly mindful of the
marginal or seasonal canner." 3 The response of these canners to
American Can seems quite unlike that which we would expect from
those so recently freed from the oppressive yoke of monopoly. It seems
more likely that that case made it more costly for the smaller canners to
buy "insurance" from the can manufacturers-so much more costly
that those canners petitioned the court to undo at least part of the mischief that it had wrought in the original decree.
There are interesting parallels between American Can and United
Shoe that lead me to suspect that the basic efficiency created by
United's leasing system also was the shifting of risk from shoe manufacturers to United. Since shoemakers made lease payments on
United's machines largely as a function of the number of operations
performed by each machine, t4 the same effect was present as was present in American Can. Lessees paid for machines as, and if, they used
them. If the machines were used more in any given period, the payments were higher during that time; if used less, they were lower. The
only difference between the two cases in this respect is that canners
REV. 62, 71 (1960). The analysis seems to have been overlooked in the second American Can
case, however, and by most commentators on it. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 320 (1970).
13. 128 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1955). It might be thought that the lease and tying
arrangements in American Can were designed to facilitate price discrimination in can closing machines. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 23-24
(1967). It also might be thought that the reaction of the small canners to the decree that made
such discrimination impossible could be explained on the theory that such discrimination favored
them over the larger canners. But such discrimination is a function of the intensity of use of each
individual machine, not of the totalnumberof machines used by each canner. Small firms may use
their machines as intensively as large firms. If so, the smaller firms would not be favored by price
discrimination and their reaction to the decree cannot be explained in terms of such discrimination. Indeed, the price discrimination explanation of tying in variable proportions situations loses
much of its force when each user uses many machines. This will be the case, in any event, where
all machines except the one at the margin are used up to capacity, a result the machine manufacturer has every reason to desire. The price discrimination "explanation" is not applicable to American Can in any event, since there were can closing machine manufacturers in the market in
addition to American and Continental and the machines were not protected by important patents.
It is more plausible in UnitedShoe because there was no comparable competition there, at least in
certain basic machines.
14. See S.WHITNEY, supra note 12, at 121.
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paid for the closing machines by buying more cans while the shoe manufacturers paid directly as their use of machines increased.
Some shoe manufacturers also appear to have been subject to risks
very much like those that seem to have been present in the canning
industry. United seems to have been in a position to deal with those
risks at a lower cost than any single shoemaker. The risk in the shoe
manufacturing industry is probably a function of consumer reaction to
style changes. A shoe manufacturer who has committed himself to
making a style of shoe that turns out to be as popular as the Edsel is not
unlike a canner whose suppliers have suffered a crop failure. Both
have expensive machines and nothing to do. They would both be
happy to defer payment to a later time. The requirements contracts
and machine leases in American Can permitted this, as did the leases in
United Shoe.

If demand for one shoemaker's output declined because consumers did not like that style, the output of some other shoemaker, who
likely also leased United machines, probably would rise. It therefore
may have been economically feasible for United, as it seems to have
been with the can manufacturers, to sell "insurance" to the users of its
machines.
It is fascinating to speculate what individual shoe manufacturers
might do after United Shoe. If the leasing system effectively shifted
risk from individual shoe manufacturers to United, its destruction
probably would prompt shoe manufacturers to attempt to find other
ways of dealing with that risk. One possible response is horizontal
mergers to create broader lines of shoes. That technique spreads the
risk that one line might be badly received. Another possible response
may be found in various means of vertical integration into the retail
level. Such an approach might reduce the risk of a bad reception by
producing better information about styles likely to be successful.
We know, of course, primarily because of the attention which the
antitrust enforcement agencies have given to the Brown Shoe Company,15 that this is exactly what happened in the shoe manufacturing
industry. There was both a decline in the number of firms in that industry and an increase of vertical integration into retailing. While both
of these "trends" appear to have antedated United Shoe slightly, there
is good reason to suspect that the shoe industry's structural changes
that were so strenuously resisted by both the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission may have been related to the former's
"success" in UnitedShoe. This suspicion is supported by inquiring into
15. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
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the kind of efficiencies United was trying to create by its leasing system,
and the changes in the environment of the shoe manufacturing industry
that might have been related to the horizontal merger and vertical integration tendencies that emerged there during the mid-1950's.
Professor Bork did not really address this. He confined himself
instead to an argument that the arrangements in United Shoe did not
contribute to output restriction and to a well-deserved general excoriation of Brown Shoe. 6 But if one shares Bork's view, as I do in general,
that the present state of antitrust law leaves much to be desired, how
much better to be able to show not only that the Brown Shoe cases
make no sense on their own terms, but that the events that prompted
them probably were caused by an earlier antitrust foray, which was, if
possible, even more misconceived than the latter two. As I have said,
we are led to such suspicions by focusing on the efficiency considerations that may be associated with the arrangements or structural
changes against which those forays have been made.
II
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND REFUSALS TO DEAL

Insufficient attention to productive efficiency considerations also
has led Bork to an incomplete analysis of two important boycott cases.
That incompleteness leads in turn to a failure to assimilate certain types
of refusals to deal with other more obviously beneficial business arrangements and, more importantly, to a significant body of intelligence
that can inform us about the efficiency-creating possibilities 6f these
refusals to deal. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 7 a
number of The Broadway's suppliers of household appliances (in response to The Broadway's request) refused to deal with Klor's-a retail
operation located next door to The Broadway in San Francisco. Bork
writes about the case:
If the decision is to find justification in antitrust terms, it must be because the boycott contained, so far as we can tell, no possibility of efficiency and did deprive consumers of an outlet they had shown they
wanted. To remove Kor's artificially was to move the distribution patcan thus perhaps be detern further from the optimal. The decision
8
fended on consumer welfare grounds.'
Bork then inserts a footnote which suggests that an alternative explanation casting doubt on the decision might involve the "free rider" problem. The Broadway might have been providing product information at
the local level while Klor's provided none. Klor's might have used its
16.
17.
18.

R. BORK, supra note 4, at 198, 302.
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
R. BORK, supra note 4, at 332.
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position next door to The Broadway to display lower prices and attract
customers to whom The Broadway already had provided information.
I developed this point in an earlier article, suggesting that when
refusals to deal of the type involved in Klor's are analyzed in terms of
their likely business purpose they appear to be much the same economic phenomenon as certain types of price "discrimination,"
franchises, dealer location arrangements, vertical territorial and customer limitations, and resale price maintenance.' 9 This is much more
than a matter of "academic" interest. To the extent that Klor's-type
refusals to deal are economically equivalent to vertical restrictions of
the type in ContinentalT P, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,2" a rule of reason approach to such boycotts would seem to be indicated, rather than
the per se approach that actually was used in Klor's. A brief description of GTE Sylvania will facilitate our discussion of Klor's.
GTE Sylvania was a private action by Continental, a former retailer of Sylvania television sets in San Francisco. When Sylvania
franchised an additional retailer in San Francisco, Continental began
selling Sylvania televisions in Sacramento, where Sylvania already had
a highly successful retail operation. The action was based on the theory that Sylvania had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by making
and enforcing franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of its products other than from specified locations. Justice Clark, sitting as district
court judge, relied on United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 2 to instruct the jury that Sylvania had committed a per se violation of section
1 if it had contracted with one or more of its dealers to restrict outlets
or store locations from which such dealers could sell products from
which title and risk of loss had passed from Sylvania. The jury under
the circumstances had no choice but to find for the plaintiff.
The court of appeals attempted to distinguish Schwinn, but the
Supreme Court overruled that case, concluding that the legality of nonprice vertical restrictions should be determined under the rule of reason. The Court thought that antitrust policy could not be divorced
from market considerations, that the primary concern of antitrust was
interbrandas distinguished from intrabrandcompetition, and that vertical (or intrabrand) restrictions could increase efficiency in several
ways. In discussing these efficiencies, the Court said:
Established manufacturers can use them [vertical restrictions] to induce
retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and
repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products.
19. Liebeler, Integrationand Competition, in VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY
13 (E. Mitchell ed. 1976).
20. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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Service and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and
major household appliances. The availability of and quality of such
services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his
product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free
rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a
purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did.22
If both Sylvania and the manufacturer(s) involved in Klor's were
trying to overcome the free rider problem, it is hard to see why future
Klor's-type situations would not be governed by GTE Sylvania. This is
particularly so because the GTE Sylvania Court indicated that future
departures from the rule of reason in this area would be based on de23
monstrable economic effect and not on the form of the transaction.
Indeed, the transactions are not really different in form; both cases involved an agreement between a manufacturer and its retailer(s) not to
deal with another retailer.2 4 The principal question is whether the
transactions in GTE Sylvania and in Klor's had similar economic purposes and effects; specifically, whether the arrangements in Klor's were
designed to deal with a free rider problem.
To develop this issue, suppose that we manufacture refrigerators
that we wish to sell through independent retailers. We provide information about our product in various national advertising media. But
information must also be supplied, models displayed, and so on, at the
retail level. In our distribution efforts we induce, among others, a chain
of department stores such as The Broadway to stock and to show our
products in its stores. We train its salespersons to do a competent job.
It advertises our line of goods, places them on display in its stores and
begins to sell them. Our average price to The Broadway per refrigerator is $500. Its average retail price, which covers the cost of providing
the level of local sales effort (information) which it and we guess to be
"correct," is $600.
All goes well for a time, until Klor's opens a small storefront operation next door that has nothing in it but catalogs, which include the
model numbers and brief descriptions of our refrigerators. Klor's
charges an average price of $550. Before long The Broadway's sales of
our product have dwindled to almost nothing, although the refrigerator
department still seems to be as populated as ever with "customers."
22. 433 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 58 & n.9, 59.
24. The only difference is that there was more than one manufacturer involved in Klor's.
This introduces a possible element of interbrand competition that was not present in GTE Sylvania. From an economic standpoint the basic question in Klor's was whether or not the refusals to
deal had the purpose or effect of restricting output, an almost impossible conclusion to reach given
the circumstances of that case.
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Kor's is selling about the same number of our refrigerators as The
Broadway had been selling before, and perhaps a few more. The
Broadway informs us that its refrigerator department is showing a substantial loss because, even though it is crowded and apparently busy, it
sells few refrigerators. It advises that it can no longer devote space and
sales personnel to our product. What do we do now?
We might charge Klor's $50 more for our refrigerators than we
charge The Broadway, thus giving the latter a cushion to cover its costs
of providing information about our refrigerators. But this would open
us to charges of price "discrimination" under the Robinson-Patman
Act. In addition, Kor's might not be getting its refrigerators directly
from us. It may be getting them on a "bootleg" basis from some wholesaler or large retailer other than The Broadway. The problems raised
by this possibility, of course, are similar to those that were involved in
Schwinn and, more recently, in GTE Sylvania.
We might give The Broadway an exclusive territory in which it is
our only retailer. If the nature of the product were such that we could
get by with only one reseller in a geographical area large enough to
discourage free riding, this could be workable. Refrigerators do not
seem to fit into such a category, however, because sales probably would
be affected significantly by the number of retailers in a particular area.
Division of territories is better suited to a product like heavy-duty
trucks, where one dealer in San Francisco could be enough. The point
is, of course, that market division can be used for at least some products
to achieve the same economic ends that can be achieved by price "discrimination."
Resale price maintenance also can be used to accomplish that
same economic objective-the specification and protection of property
rights in information produced by the protected reseller. It may be
most effective when we need a large number of retail outlets to cover an
area effectively. We could set the resale .price of our refrigerators at
about the same price The Broadway had been charging. This would be
high enough to cover its costs of providing the information that we
want supplied at the retail level, yet not so high as to provide any comparably efficient reseller with windfall profits at our expense or to reduce our sales appreciably below the level that would have obtained in
the absence of the free rider problem. Since Klor's would not be able
to cut prices below $600 on average-the same average price being
charged by The Broadway---consumers would have no incentive to buy
from Kor's after getting their information at The Broadway. This
should end the free rider problem and make it possible for us to get the
"appropriate" amount of information about our product produced at
the retail level.
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Each of these three forms of business arrangement-price discrimination, market division, and resale price maintenance-serves the
same economic purpose, but only the various forms of market division
involve a total refusal to deal. These refusals to deal are, in any practical sense of the word, "concerted." There is at least an implicit understanding with any franchisee, for example, that another person will not
be franchised to operate next door. Such refusals to deal were involved
in White Motor Co. v. United States,25 in Schwinn, and most importantly, in GTE Sylvania.
Bork has had no difficulty perceiving how the refusals to deal in
those cases created efficiencies. His failure to connect Klor's to those
cases appears to reflect a greater reliance on the way in which the arrangements in those cases were characterized and on the way in which
the legal issues were framed than on the underlying economic realities.
I cannot see any economic difference between a case in which Sylvania
agrees with its Sacramento retailer to refuse to sell television sets to
Continental for resale in Sacramento, in order to prevent Continental
from "free riding" on the existing Sacramento retailer, and one in
which General Electric refuses to sell refrigerators to Klor's for resale
next door to The Broadway in order to prevent Klor's from "free riding" on The Broadway. Nor is it clear that matters are at all changed
by the fact that other suppliers of The Broadway did the same thing.
That is exactly what we would expect. If GE finds it efficient to protect
The Broadway's property rights in locally produced information about
GE products, it should come as no surprise that other suppliers would
have the same incentive as to similar products of their own. While an
interbrand restriction of competition between GE and makers of other
brands of refrigerators could be a matter of concern in cases which
appear to involve a manufacturer's cartel, that could not conceivably
have been involved in Klor's because the boycott there eliminated only
one small retailer adjacent to The Broadway.
It is not only false, as Bork states in his text, that Klor's involved
"no possibility of efficiency," but the efficiency involved is exactly like
that which is present in the price fixing and market division cases that
Bork treats so well in his earlier articles and elsewhere in his book.26
Once this is seen, the relevance of GTE Sylvania to the Klor's-type situation-a point not mentioned by Bork-becomes clear. If GTE Sylvania does not overrule Klor's-and it could be argued that it does not,
because of the horizontal agreement alleged in Klor's-it certainly provides discerning counsel with new and powerful arguments against attacks on refusals to deal of the type involved in Klor's.
25. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
26. R. BoRIC, supra note 4, at 263; Bork, supra note 1.
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I also have trouble with the way Bork handles Fashion Originators'
Guild ofAmerica v. FTC, 7 which involved a women's garment industry trade organization. Some of its members designed, made, sold or
distributed garments while others dealt in the textiles from which those
garments were made. The garment manufacturers claimed to be creators of original dress designs; the textile makers made the same claim
as to textiles. Nonmembers of the guild systematically copied these designs and sold their copied dresses at lower prices. Guild members
agreed to boycott retail stores that sold copies.
The FTC and the Supreme Court both viewed the boycott as an
attempt to suppress the competition of the copiers, which it clearly
was-just as the refusals to deal in White Motor, Schwinn, GTE Sylva-

nia, and Kor-s involved attempts to suppress competition. The question remains, of course, whether this suppression contributed to the
restriction of output or the creation of efficiency, a question which Bork
correctly urges should not be suppressed simply because a refusal to
deal may be involved. Restriction of output seems improbable. There
were 176 different garment manufacturing firms in the guild, and these
firms, according to the Supreme Court, continued to compete with each
other in many ways. In addition, they faced competition from others:
in 1936 the guild sold only 60% of all ladies garments wholesaling for
$10.75 or more. Effective collusion under such circumstances does not
seem likely.
But if output restriction was not the principal purpose or effect of
the boycott, what was? Bork advances an efficiency theory in suggesting that guild members were trying to prevent the copiers from free
riding on product information produced at the retail level. They did
this by pressuring retailers to keep copies out of stores in which originals were sold. Exclusive dealing would force retailers to promote garments produced by guild members and prevent copiers from free riding
on sales efforts by the resellers.
Bork conjectures that collective exclusive dealing with guild members, instead of with only one of them, may have been necessary because no one manufacturer could offer a sufficiently complete line of
garments to enable retailers to deal exclusively with them. In this view,
the guild members are the equivalent of a contract firm with respect to
distribution activities. The boycott is, thus, an attempt to specify prop,
erty rights in locally produced product information and is not unlike
Klor's, or at least the view of Klor's that I have outlined above. As
Bork puts it:
The insistence of the group that copies not be sold by their retailers
27.

312 U.S. 457 (1941); R. BORK, supra note 4, at 338.
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may look like predation directed at the copyists, but it may be nothing
more than an attempt to gain the efficiencies of advertising and promotion that lead to exclusive dealing in many industries.28
This seems improbable. First, there is no obvious reason why an
integration of 176 firms was necessary to obtain a sufficiently full line
of garments to permit exclusive dealing. One would suppose that cooperative arrangements among many fewer firms would have been adequate to achieve this goal.
Additionally, there is no real mystery about what the guild members were trying to accomplish with the boycott. They stated a coherent explanation in their defense, which the FTC typically refused to
credit. In fact, the FTC excluded most of the proffered evidence on the
issue. The guild claimed that it was trying "to protect the manufacturer, laborer, retailer and consumer against the devastating evils growing from the pirating of original designs and had in fact benefited all
four."'29 They were, in more formal terms, attempting to create a system of property rights in the designs themselves by raising the costs that
the copiers had to incur to copy effectively.
There was, to be sure, not a complete specification of such property rights, since the copiers were not prevented from copying and still
could sell their copies in other stores. But to the extent that consumers
would have to incur search and other transaction costs in order to locate and obtain copies there was a more complete specification of property rights in the original dress designs. Since there was no real
possibility of market monopoly involved, it would seem that the principal (or only) effect of the boycott would be to increase the extent to
which the benefits of investment in original dress designs could be internalized (Le., captured by the investor) thereby moving such investment to more optimum levels compared to what they would have been
absent the boycott.
It could, of course, be objected that the scope and nature of property rights in "original" dress designs and the like is the proper domain
of the federal patent and copyright laws and should not concern the
antitrust law. This objection would not be well taken even from a
strictly legal standpoint; it has even less basis on economic or policy
grounds. Issues of property rights in "original" designs and ideas arise
and are decided as a matter of course in unfair competition cases.3 °
There is no obvious reason why they can or should not be handled in
antitrust cases as well, and indeed they are, although that fact is not
widely recognized. It is often thought that the purposes of antitrust law
28.
29.
30.

R. BORK, supra note 4, at 339.
312 U.S. at 467.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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and of unfair competition law generally conflict. It is said that the
thrust of antitrust law is to prevent restraints of competition while the
purpose of the law of unfair competition is to impose them. 3' On a
more basic level, however, the purposes of these two branches of the
law are the same. Properly construed, they both aim (or should aim) at
the creation of a property rights system that enables the market to bperate more efficiently than would any alternative specification of property
rights.
In fact, the antitrust cases have been involved in specifying property rights from the beginning. Judge Taft explicated the doctrine of
ancillary restraints, using as examples agreements by sellers and buyers
of property not to compete with their buyers and sellers, respectively;
agreements of retiring partners not to compete with the partnership;
and agreements of partners not to compete with the partnership while
they are members of the firm. According to Taft, the common law at
first refused to recognize the validity of any of these agreements, but
changed over time to recognize that "it was in the interest of trade" that
such agreements be generally upheld as valid 32if ancillary to a main
transaction and if monopoly was not involved.
The issue in one of Taft's examples is whether a seller lawfully
may bind himself not to compete with the buyer of his business, in
order to create a transferable property right in the "good will" of that
business. Recognizing and enforcing such a property right enables
such sellers to obtain in a sale the benefits of their previous efforts and
investment, and thereby changes the incentive structure to engage in
that activity. Resolving this question involves at least an implicit costbenefit analysis no different in principle from that involved in the decision to adopt a patent law. The decision to recognize a property right
in a seller's goodwill or in a partnership's right to be free from the
competition of its members is based on a judgment that the increased
productive efficiency outweighs the possible resulting reduction in allocative efficiency. The economic issues in Taft's examples are no different from those in FOGA/. Neither can be resolved without engaging in
a rough cost-benefit analysis, which should be the main thrust of the
rule of reason. If the issues involved in Taft's examples are appropriate
for decision in antitrust cases, there is no obvious reason why the same
is not true for the issues in FOGA.
This analysis of the efficiency-creating potential in FOGA-an attempt to create a property rights system in the original designs of guild
members-seems more probably correct than that offered by Bork.
31. Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Indus. Inc. 576 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.271, 280-82 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Developing this point seems worthwhile because it raises interesting
questions about the test (basically the ancillary restraints test) which
Bork suggests might be used to distinguish predatory boycotts, to which
the per se rule should be applied, from those which may be efficiencycreating and, therefore, governed by the rule of reason. That test turns
on the presence or absence of "other joint economic activity" to which
the elimination of competition involved may be ancillary. It is hard to
see such activity in FOGA, and yet it seems that the per se rule should
not have been applied in that case.
In suggesting his test for distinguishing predatory boycotts from
those which may create efficiencies, Bork says:
A comparison of Klor's and [NationalTrailer Rental Service] suggests

that boycotts are likely to be predatory when the parties are engaged in
no other joint economic activity, and may be efficiency-creating when
they are.33
NTRS involved an organization of trailer rental operators created
to facilitate the movement of trailers rented for one-way trips between
cities. There was extensive integration of productive activities of the
members of the system-they were really partners in the intercity
trailer rental business. Their refusal to admit other firms into the association, nevertheless, was held a per se violation of section 1.
Bork uses NTRS as an example of a case in which there was an
integration of productive facilities to which the elimination of competition could be ancillary, and Klor's as an example of a case in which
there was not. I have already suggested that this view of Klor's is incorrect; the vendor-vendee relations involved there created an integration just as it does, as Bork notes, in any vertical case. 34 Although
Bork's use of Klor's as an example of a case in which there was no
integration of productive facilities is, therefore, inapposite, let us see
how the test he proposes in comparing NTRS and Klor's works when
applied to my view of the efficiency-creating potential in FOGA.
The "other joint economic activity" of the FOGA members to
which their boycott may have been ancillary-thus bringing the rule of
reason into play-is much harder to discern than it is in either NTRS
or Klor's. There was inFOGA, to use Taft's language from United
States v. Addyston Pioe & Steel Co., "no relation of partnership, or of
vendor and vendee, or of employer and employee. ' 35 Nor does the
FOGA boycott seem to fit within the category of cases to which the rule
33. R. BORK, supra note 4, at 334 (discussing United States v. National Trailer Rental Systems, 156 F. Supp. 241 (D. Kan. 1957)).
34. See Bork, The Rule of Reason andthe Per Se Concept: Price Fixingand Market Division

(pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966).
35. 85 F. at 290.
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of reason will be applied as described in the most recent Supreme
Court pronouncement on the subject, NationalSociety of Professional

Engineers v. UnitedStates, in which Justice Stevens indicated that the
rule of reason would be applied to eliminations of competition "which
are ancillary to a legitimate transaction, such as an employment contract or the sale of a going business."36 The garment makers were, to
be sure, all members of the same trade association (FOGA) and as such
did engage in certain joint activities. But none of them seem to be like
the kind of joint economic activity to which restrictions on competition
have been held ancillary in other cases.
It could be said that the FOGA members joined their efforts to
create a more completely specified system of property rights in the original designs which they each supposedly created. Acceptance of this
characterization would satisfy the requirement that there be present
other joint economic activity with a principal lawful purpose to avoid
application of the per se rule.
I would not be surprised if many had difficulty accepting that
characterization. Associating to create a property rights system to internalize more completely the benefits of investment in original designs
seems a far cry from the more mundane association that we generally
think about when we think of ancillary restraint cases. It does not seem
at all like what Taft must have had in mind when he wrote of the case
"when two men became partners in a business, although their union
might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to the main
purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a
successful business, and one useful to the community. ' 37 And yet, if
my analysis of FOGA is correct, the elimination of competition attempted there may have increased the net wealth of the community by
more accurately guiding investment in "original" dress designs in response to consumer demand. If so, there is as much justification for
applying the rule of reason to the FOGA boycott as to agreements of
partners not to compete with the partnership in Taft's hypothetical.
This result could be reached in either of two ways. As mentioned
above, the attempt to create a more completely specified system of
property rights could be accepted as joint activity sufficient to satisfy
the ancillary restraints doctrine, thereby triggering a rule of reason
analysis. Or it could be recognized that in some cases joint economic
activity of the more traditional kind is not required to avoid the per se
rule. In such cases, the court could simply pass over the joint economic
activity requirement, which is simply a proxy for efficiency-creating potential, and focus directly on the basic issue: Is there any way in which
36.
37.

435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
85 F. at 280.
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the arrangement involved could contribute to the possible creation of
efficiency? Although this would require a slight modification of the
traditional ancillary restraints doctrine, it has the advantage of reminding us that the requirement of other, legitimate, joint economic
activity is nothing more than a proxy for underlying efficiency-creating
potential.
Since the result would be the same under each alternative, it
makes little difference which is adopted. Either could avoid the restrictions of the per se rule which might be applied if the requirement of
"other joint economic activity" is taken too literally or viewed too narrowly. Bork certainly would not do this purposely. But his improbable
view of the efficiency-creating potential in FOG, avoided the issue of
how to handle an arrangement which, if not naked, surely is more
scantily clad than the more traditional arrangements to which the ancillary restraints doctrine is applied. My analysis would avoid applying
the per se rule to such arrangements, even though their efficiency-creating potential is more subtle than that of the ordinary partnership.
III
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY, PRICE FIXING,
AND MARKET DIVISION

Bork treats price fixing and market division more extensively than
most other arrangements by drawing heavily on his earlier work on
those subjects. Yet even here additional comment seems warranted.
Take, for example, his discussion of United States v. Sealy, Inc. 8
Sealy licensed certain mattress manufacturers, who in turn owned
almost all of Sealy's outstanding shares, to make and sell products
under the Sealy name. The shareholder-licensees, whose sales were
limited to specific territories, paid Sealy royalties on their sale of Sealy
mattresses. 9 Sealy and its licensees in turn set and policed the retail
prices at which such mattresses could be sold by the retailers who
purchased from the licensee-manufacturers. The lower court upheld
the government's charge of illegal price fixing but refused to find that
the market division constituted an unreasonable retraint of trade. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding the market division to be illegal as
part of an aggregation of trade restraints.
Bork argues that neither the price fixing nor the market division
should have been held illegal because they could not have restricted
38. 388 U.S. 350 (1967); R. BORK, supra note 4, at 270.
39. Contrary to statements in Sealy, it appears that Sealy also collected royalties on all other
mattresses manufactured by its licensees, whether they were identified as Sealy mattresses or not.
See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978).
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output. He also outlines how those arrangements probably contributed
to efficiency by preventing the Sealy licensees from taking free rides on
each other's efforts to produce product information at the local level,
thereby bringing investment in such product information closer to the
optimal amount.
My principal problem is with Bork's statement that the control of
Sealy by its licensees brought the Supreme Court to decide "without
doubt correctly, that the restraints could not be classified as vertically
imposed but were horizontal restraints between the controlling manufacturer-licensees." 4 Bork's view that the price fixing and market division were horizontal led him to rely on the relatively small size of
Sealy's market share to conclude that output restriction could not have
resulted from those arrangements, and in turn to argue that the Court
should have remanded so that their legality could be determined after a
trial on the issue of whether Sealy's size gave it market power. This
would have been an appropriate disposition of a case in which the government attacked the creation of the Sealy "contract firm" itself. But
Sealy was not such a case. The case before the Court was limited to
the market division arrangements and, at least in the court below, the
price fixing. The legality of Sealy's existence as a firm was never questioned.
To play the game first on the characterization issue, Professor
Bork, Professor Posner, and the Seal, Court4" seem wrong to treat
these restraints as horizontal. Mr. Justice Harlan correctly regarded
them as vertical, although neither he, nor anyone else as far as I know,
reached that conclusion using correct analysis. If the price fixing and
market division really are vertical, the question of market shareunder Bork's view of vertical arrangements at any rate-becomes irrelevant.42 There was no need to remand for trial on the issue of market
share to conclude that the price fixing and market division were legal.
This conclusion readily follows from Bork's own analysis of verti40. R. BORK, supra note 4, at 270 (discussing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967)).
41. 388 U.S. at 352. Posner states: "The Court was quite right in stating that, in substance,

the territorial restrictions were horizontal. That is, they were imposed by the Sealy licensees themselves.

...R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 226

(1974). The statement that someone "imposed" something is not a meaningful statement in economic terms, and, in addition, is a poor way to determine whether an arrangement is horizontal or
vertical. Bork occasionally makes the same error, see, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 288, and in fact
did so in his analysis of Seay, id. at 270. A more relevant inquiry is whether an arrangement has
the potential to restrict output. Those that do should be called horizontal. What one calls the rest
is largely a matter of taste as far as I can see. Since the explicit eliminations of competition in
Sealy did not have the potential to restrict output beyond what could have been accomplished
simply by setting royalty rates, they were not horizontal.
42. This follows, of course, from the fact that Bork believes that all vertical arrangements
should be lawful. R. BORK, supra note 4, at 297.
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cal arrangements. He argues that all truly vertical arrangements should
be legal because no single firm can use them as an output-restricting
device. A firm such as White Motor can extract the fruits of whatever
market power it might have by restricting the output of trucks at the
manufacturing level, without becoming involved in any direct limitation on competition between its resellers. Any such limitation of competition between resellers will be vertical in nature; it will neither
increase horizontal market share, nor the manufacturer's ability to re43
strict output.
The price fixing and market division in Sealy, therefore, might be
considered vertical, although the terms "vertical" and "horizontal"
should be replaced for clarity with "intrabrand" and "interbrand," respectively. The use of price fixing and market division by Sealy-even
if Sealy is regarded as the "mere instrumentality" of its manufacturerowners-would not add to the ability of Sealy, or of those owners, to
restrict output. That ability (if and to the extent it is at all possible
given market constraints) is ensured because each manufacturer-owner
is required to pay Sealy a royalty on each Sealy mattress sold. Just as
White Motor could extract the fruits of its market power (if any) by
setting the price of trucks at the manufacturing level, Sealy could do
the same for mattresses by setting the royalty rate to each of its manufacturer-owners. In the same sense that the market division in Wfhite
Motor could not contribute to the restriction of output, no matter what
share of the market White Motor held, neither could the market division and price fixing involved in Sealy.
The explicit restraints involved in a case such as Sealy therefore
are not necessary to wield whatever market power the firm might have.
The restraints thus should be deemed vertical, or intrabrand. This observation is important for at least three reasons. First, it focuses attention on the real issue in such cases: whether joining the formerly
independent mattress makers with the trademark licensing program,
without regardto thepricefixingandmarket division, is a possible violation of the Sherman Act. In a case like Sealy, this question scarcely
survives its asking. It seems improbable that, absent explicit price
fixing and market division, it would ever have occurred4 to any antitrust
enforcement official to challenge the Sealy operation. 4
Second, the effects of explicit restraints are important in terms of
43. Id. at 288.
44. Ironically, the Justice Department approved a program under which Sealy and all or
substantially all of its licensees would merge into a single firm. This was done in a letter issued
February 8, 1973. See Brief for Defendants and Cross-Appellants, Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co.
v. Scaly, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978). That such a merger would eliminate intrabrand competition among the Sealy licensees--the issue over which United States v. Sealy was foughtseemed not to be a problem.
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the appropriate remedy should the arrangements ever appear to involve a serious attempt to form a cartel. In Sealy, for example, the
Justice Department and the Court were pleased to eliminate the explicit price fixing and market division. But this remedy in no way
would have affected Sealy's ability to form a cartel in the mattress industry, if that in fact had been involved. Sealy could have continued to
do that by setting royalty rates, an ability that was never questioned. If
a cartel had been involved, the entire Sealy organization should have
been dissolved; an injunction against the explicit price fixing and market division would have been ineffective.
Third, the characterization of the explicit eliminations of competition in Seaoy as vertical (intrabrand) is important because it clearly
demonstrates the relevance of GTE Sylvania. My suggested analysis
under Sylvania of the Sealy market division arrangements would be
somewhat different from the horizontal analysis that Bork would apply,
principally in that Sealy's market share would not be in issue.45 We
would both reach the same result-that the Sealy restrictions were legal-because Bork would, correctly, apply the ancillary restraints doctrine to the Seal, restrictions even though he views them as horizontal.
But the ability to characterize arrangements such as the explicit
eliminations of competition in Sealy as "vertical" (intrabrand) nevertheless may be of considerable practical import. The courts are not
nearly as sophisticated as Professor Bork when it comes to applying the
rule of reason to "horizontal" restraints, or to distinguishing on sensible
economic grounds as opposed to form, "vertical" from "horizontal" restrictions. An example of this lack of sophistication is the recent case in
which an Ohio franchisee won a jury verdict against Sealy for an
amount greater than Sealy's total net worth, on the ground that Sealy
continued to violate the antitrust laws by enforcing a complex set of
arrangements, including profit passovers, exclusive manufacturing territories, manufacturing location clauses, warranty repair charges, and a
right of first refusal in Sealy in case any licensee were to sell his busi45. Under my analysis, the complaint in UnitedStates v. Seal, can be handled in three steps.
First, the complaint did not raise any question as to the legality of Sealy's existence as an issue
separate and apartfrom the attack on the explicit pricefixing and market division arrangements.

Second, given this and the fact that Scaly could legally fix royalty rates on the sale of Scaly
mattresses by its licensees, any restrictions on competition within the Scaly organization were
intrabrandrestrictions, the legality of which should be governed by GTE Sylvania. Third, since
the government made no attempt to show that these intrabrandrestrictions had any affect on
interbrandcompetition, either by establishing or reinforcing a manufacturer's or a reseller's cartel,

the complaint should have been dismissed. If the government should challenge the trademark
licensing program itself, the horizontal market share issue would arise. But that would be a different case and it would have nothing to do with the explicit price fixing and market division attacked by the case which the government actually brought.
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ness.4 6 These were designed to replace the exclusive territorial sales
restrictions invalidated by United States v. Sealy. Upholding the judgment below, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit believed that
it was "indisputably clear that any restraints applied to the independent
businesses which are licensees result directly from the concerted action
of their horizontal potential competitors. Accordingly . . . if Sealy's
license agreement and its conduct thereunder amounted to substantial
limitations on manufacturers' sales territories, a per se violation existed."4' 7
After laying that foundation, the court thought itself free to ignore
GTE Sylvania:
Sylvania overruled ... [Schwinn 1, and held, as had the White Motor
case . . . decided only four years before Schwinn, that vertically-imposed territorial limitations must be judged not by a per se rule but by
the Rule of Reason. Because the Court in Sylvania expressly reaffirmed the appropriateness of the per se rule for horizontal territorial
limits. . . it is difficult to see how the decision advances Sealy's argument. It insists nonetheless that the very premise of the Sylvania decision is that restrictions on intrabrand competition may promote
interbrand competition, thus making it impossible to say that such restraints have the requisite 'manifestly anticompetitive' nature to justify
a per se rule of illegality. . . . In United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc. . . ., however, the Court rejected exactly this argument in the
context of horizontal restraints. . . and the Sylvania decision expressly
reaffirmed that rejection.48
As a matter of "formalistic line drawing," the argument is impeccable: the Sealy restrictions are "horizontal"; GTE Sylvania applies
only to "vertical" arrangements; therefore, GTE Sylvania does not apply to the Sealy restrictions. As a matter of "demonstrable economic
effect," 4 9 the argument leaves much to be desired. It is more than
mildly disturbing that the Supreme Court did not see fit to grant certiorari in Ohio-Sealy, taking advantage of the opportunity to clarify some
of the things that it said in GTE Sylvania.50 While I cannot develop all
or even a major part of the implications of Sylvania here, I will treat
briefly the sources of the confusion that led the Seventh Circuit to the
unfortunate result that it reached in Ohio-Sealy.
Perhaps the principal source of confusion lies in the fact that the
legal categories of "horizontal" and "vertical" do not correspond with
46. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978). The trial
judge cut the award in half after he discovered that he was required to treble it.
47. Id. at 827.
48. Id. at 830-31 (footnotes omitted).
49. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
50. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ohio-Sealy. See 902 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) A-17 (Feb. 22, 1979).
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any relevant economic concepts. If the Supreme Court is to abandon
"formalistic line drawing" in favor of "demonstrable economic effect"
or an antitrust policy based on market considerations, it will have to
abandon or redefine the legal concepts of "horizontal" and "vertical,"
or extend the rule of reason treatment which it afforded to vertical arrangements by its Sylvania decision to certain kinds of horizontal arrangements. Let me develop this point by examining some of the basic
economics implicit in Sylvania.
An antitrust policy based on market considerations should, as
Bork argues, focus on two concerns: (1) the losses that result from output restriction; and (2) the gains that result from arrangements that enhance productive efficiency. Taking the first concern, what do firms do
in order to create or increase their ability to restrict output? Reduced
to elementals, they may merge or engage in other activities to become
"monopolists," or they may collude with enough of their competitors so
that their collective market share is of "monopolistic" proportions, to
set price and other terms of trade.5 Most economists would be concerned about (or at least interested in) an event that increased the market share of one firm to "monopolistic" levels, or that increased the
probability that independent firms in the industry could successfully
collude, comparing in both cases the situation that existedprior to that
event with the situation existing after it. Any such event (i e., a merger
or contract that increased the market share subject to the control of one
actor beyond that which was so controlled prior to the event) can usefully be thought of from an economic standpoint as a horizontal event.
Not all horizontal events will increase the potential for output restriction; indeed, very few of them probably will. It seems safe to say for
present purposes, however, that unless an arrangement increases market share beyond that which already existed before hand, the arrangement almost
certainly will not increase the potential for output
52
restriction.
51. While I do not want to get into a detailed discussion of economic theory here, I must
note that control of a "monopolistic" market share is merely a necessary condition of the ability to
restrict output; it is not a sufficient condition.
52. I can think of only one situation in which this might not be true. If dealers who sell only
the product of one manufacturer form a dealer cartel, if there is significant market power as to the
product, and if for some reason the dealers and the manufacturer are not able to agree on a price
and output which would maximize their joint profits (which would, of course, be the same price
and output that existed prior to formation of the dealer cartel), output may be less and price
higher than before the dealer cartel was formed. It is hard to imagine, however, that these conditions would exist very often, if ever, unless the law foolishly constrained the parties' freedom to
contract. While the law has done exactly that, we may hope that such things will come to an end
with the new era of economic sophistication that GTE Sylvania presumably portends. See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp.
470 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Liebeler, Toward a Consumer's Antitrust Law- The FederalTrade
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Let me try to make these points more concrete by applying them to
the language of footnote 28 in GTE Sylvania:
There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the
retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category
would be illegal per se, see, e.g., United States v. General Motors
Corp., . . United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. . . . , but we do

not regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to justify a per se
rule.53
The Court here adopts a definition of "horizontal" that is quite different from mine, one based on form rather than on economic analysis. In
the Court's definition an agreement is "horizontal" if it originates in
agreements among the retailers. In my definition an agreement cannot
be horizontal no matter how many retailers promote it, or to what extent, as long as the retailers do not sell products produced by other
firms which compete with those subject to the restriction. While this
condition exists, no agreement among the retailers or with the manufacturer and some or all of those retailers can increase market share
beyond that which was held by the manufacturer before the restriction. 4
My definition of "horizontal" makes it mean much the same as
"interbrand." Life would be much simpler if we could all agree that
the Sylvania Court meant that it would apply the rule of reason to (or
ignore) all nonprice restrictions on intrabrandcompetition, particularly
because the Court said in footnote 19 that interbrandcompetition was
the primary concern of antitrust law." But that is not the import of
footnote 28, where the Couirt approved of two cases which held restrictions on intrabrandcompetition to be per se illegal.
One way to deal with the Seventh Circuit's Ohio-Sealy decision
and to cut down on the inconsistencies in GTE Sylvania would be to
recognize that, at least in this area of the law, "horizontal" means much
the same as "interbrand," and "vertical" and "intrabrand" are essentially synonymous. This would have required the reversal of OhioSealy and, sensibly, the dismissal of the complaint in that action, as
well as the recognition that the statements in Sylvania's footnote 28
were mistaken. The only way to square Ohio-Sealy and footnote 28
with the Court's concern for interbrand competition, demonstrable ecoCommission and Vertical Mergersin the Cement Industry, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1153, 1178 (1968).

I will develop this point more fully in a forthcoming article on the implications of GTE Sylvania.
53. 433 U.S. at 59 n.28.
54. See note 52 supra. I suppose that market power also could be increased, without changing horizontal market share, if barriers to entry on the manufacturing level were somehow increased. I can see no way in which a cartel of the dealers of one manufacturer could do that.
55. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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nomic effect, and an antitrust policy based on market considerations is
to engage in formalistic line drawing.
IV
GTE SYLVANIA

AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS

GTE Sylvania strongly implies that any efficiency-creating business arrangement is legal. The form of the arrangement should be irrelevant. Sylvania is most obviously relevant to cases in which a single
supplier terminates a reseller, whether or not at the request of another
reseller. Such terminations may increase productive efficiency in a variety of ways, most obviously by enabling the remaining dealer(s) to
recoup their investment in locally generated information about the supplier's product and to increase their incentives to provide essential services. It also is relevant to other arrangements used to accomplish that
result. I have listed several of these methods in my discussion of /or's
above: price discrimination, franchises, location restrictions, intrabrand territorial and customer limitations, resale price maintenance,
and exclusive dealing arrangements. And, as I have argued, Sylvania is
inconsistent with Topco and GeneralMotors, both of which involved
restrictions on intrabrand competition of the type listed above. In each
of these cases (Klor's, Topco, GeneralMotors, as well as Seay), the
challenged arrangements were designed to prevent some members of
an intrabrand integration from taking free rides on other members' efforts.
Sylvania also is relevant, although less obviously so, to tying arrangements such as that in Fortner Enterprises,Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp.56 In Fortner, a U.S. Steel subsidiary extended credit to
Fortner, a Louisville real estate developer, on favorable terms conditioned upon Fortner's purchase of prefabricated steel homes from the
steel company. If the credit had been extended without the tie, Fortner
could have taken a free ride on U.S. Steel by using the funds to buy
houses from another company or to do something unrelated to the
housing transaction. U.S. Steel used the tie to create a property right in
itself to control the use of the funds which it lent Fortner on terms that
he could get nowhere else. It is hard to see why U.S. Steel could not do
this if Sylvania legitimately could protect the property rights of its
resellers in product information which they produced. No output restriction was possible in either case and both arrangements created obvious efficiencies.
56. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). The analysis in the text would also seem to apply to FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). The services provided by Brown there are analogous to the financing provided by U.S. Steel in Fortner. The partial exclusive dealing arrangements in Brown Shoe

correspond to the tying arrangement in Fortner.
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Fortneralso could have been disposed of by applying the ancillary
restraints
doctrine set forth in UnitedStates v. Addyston Pipe and Steel
Co. 5 7 The tie-in is ancillary to the legitimate contract integration be-

tween U.S. Steel and Fortner. This point seems obvious, but Addyston
was not even mentioned by the U.S. Steel counsel at any point in the
tortuous history of that case, in Bork's analysis of Fortner,or in by far
the best law review commentary on that case. 8 Perhaps this is because
Judge Taft never mentioned tie-ins or prefabricated steel houses in Addyston. The failure to recognize the relevance of Addyston to Fortneris
a significant tribute to the power of formalism in antitrust.
V
HORIZONTAL MERGERS AND CONTRACT INTEGRATIONS

I close with several brief remarks on the rule which Bork proposes
for horizontal mergers. This is an important subject because the horizontal merger rules should guide, if not determine, the legality under
the rule of reason of horizontal contract integrations such as those in
Sealy. It is important also because many of the considerations relevant
to horizontal merger policy are relevant to how the antitrust law should
handle concentrated industries. Bork couches his proposed horizontal
merger rule entirely in terms of market share. He would be uneasily
satisfied with a rule
making presumptively lawful all horizontal mergers up to market
shares that would allow for other mergers of similar size in the industry
and still leave three significant companies. In a fragmented market,
this would indicate a maximum share attainable by merger of about 40
percent.... [Wihere one company already had 50 percent, it could
not engage in any horizontal mergers, and no other company could
create by merger a share above 30 percent (barring some exceptional
circumstance, such as the imminent failure of one of the merger partners).59

Exclusive reliance on market share and concentration seems odd in
view of Bork's earlier favorable quote of Harold Demsetz:
[T]he asserted relationship between market concentration and competition cannot be derived from existing theoretical considerations and...
is based largely on an incorrect understanding of the concept of competition or rivalry...
[We have no theory that allows us to deducefrom the observa/..
ble degree of concentration in a particularmarket whether or not price
57.

85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

58. Dam, FortnerEnterprisesv. UnitedStates Steek "Neithera Borrower,Nor a Lender Be,"
1969 Sup. CT. REv. 1.

59. R. BORK, supra note 4, at 221-22.
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and output are competitive.

This seems odd because if we have no theory that permits us to relate
the degree of concentration in an industry to the degree of its competitiveness then we have no theory by which we may presume about the
legality of horizontal mergers based on market share and concentration, at least in those cases in which the number of postmerger firms is
greater than one.
We cannot move directly from concentration ratios to estimates of
competitiveness, of course, because the degree of competitiveness in
any industry with more than one firm is a function of the extent to
which the firms in that industry tacitly can collude-a consideration
that depends on many factors in addition to industry concentration.
Since horizontal mergers can injure consumer welfare only if they increase the probability of successful collusion in an industry, their legality should be a function of the extent to which they are likely to
increase that probability. Their legality, in other words, should be a
function of the many factors that appear to affect the ability of firms
successfully to collude. Market concentration is only one factor and, in
many cases, not even the most important. 6' Except in those cases
where concentration is so low as to make successful collusion unlikely
even if all other conditions were favorable, it surely is not enough on
which to base even a presumption about the legality of horizontal
mergers.
CONCLUSION

I do not mean any of this review to be taken as critical of the
substance of Bork's work. It is easy enough to carp, and I do not mean
to do so. This is not to say, however, that Bork's work is the last word,
as he, indeed, would be the last to claim. Further advances in antitrust
theory are possible and are in fact being made. I have tried in this
review to make some modest suggestions to that end.
Bork's contributions to antitrust policy have been enormous. It is
unfortunate that his influence in that field has not been greater by far
than it has in fact been. We would all be poorer without him, particularly those who, like myself, think that economic analysis has much to
contribute to the development of the law. He has written an excellent
book. It should be required reading for every judge who presumes to
opine on antitrust law and for every lawyer who presumes to practice it.
60. Demsetz, hy Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcON. 55, 59-60 (1968) (emphasis in original), quoted in R. BORK, supra note 4, at 221-22.
61. Other factors relevant to the ability of firms to collude even in concentrated industries
and authorities discussing this subject are set forth in Liebeler, supra note 3, at 1252-54.

CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, by Robert H. Mnookin. Boston: Little,

Brown & Co., 1978. Pp. 838 $20.00.

Reviewed by Henry W. McGee, Jr.
Child,Family and State' is more than the offspring of a marriage
between family law and juvenile court casebooks. The content, organi-

zation, and central proposition of the book all serve to differentiate it
from traditional family law casebooks which stress the husband-wife
relationship and the dependent role of children in the family structure.

Professor Mnookin's book is noteworthy for its emphasis on developments in the law by which children have been granted a panoply of

important rights. In a section discussing constitutional sources of such
rights, Mnookin sets forth his model succinctly. He first acknowledges
the traditional conception embraced in the cases of the child as subject

to the authority of parents and state. He then points to a principle appearing only in more recent cases: "Young people may have rights of
their own, some of which are of constitutional dimension."'2 As
Mnookin states, the remainder of the casebook examines the manner in
which the legal system has reconciled the conflict between these principles.3

Mnookin's book reflects a concern generated in part by the political struggles of the sixties. Many courses which were rare before the

emergence of the civil rights and antiwar movements, such as environmental or poverty law, are prominent in many law school curricula in
the late seventies.4 Like those of the poor and prisoners, the problems
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE (1978).
2. Id at 107.
3.

Id.

4. The Association of American Law Schools lists only three professors as having taught
environmental law for more than ten years, but 62 as having taught the course from six to ten
years and 244 for one to five years. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF
LAW TEACHERS 960-62 (1977). The directory reports that 25 professors have taught a course on
law and poverty for six to ten years in contrast to 161 who have taught the course for one to five
years. Id at 998-99.
The proliferation of these and other innovative law school courses illustrates a distinguished
educator's observation that a
new radicalism is beginning to enter the mainstream of legal education, goaded not a
little by the complicated phenomena and momentous events with which law must deal.
Law schools search for a newer and more satisfying identity through curricular movements that espouse clinical training, public and policy oriented law, 'lawyering' emphasis, social science incorporation, and more.
Redmount, A Concefptual View of the Legal Education Process,24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129 (1972).
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of children were scattered through different courses and casebooks.

The only significant body of materials on children and the law was
usually found in family law casebooks. In particular, two family law
casebooks, both published in the mid-1960's, provided a consideration
of children in the context of the family. The more traditional of the
two devoted a chapter to state intervention in the parent-child relationship, and included chapters on illegitimacy, adoption, and custody on
divorce. The other casebook treated in some depth state involvement
in family affairs, focusing especially on the problems of custody and
adoption.7 Like other family law casebooks,8 neither treated children's
legal problems with the distinctive focus employed by Mnookin. 9
The major structural changes that occurred in the organization of law schools in the wake of
societal unrest are traced in Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: LegalEducation and Lawyer Com.petency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REy. 695, 841-92.
5. Some attention is devoted to children in courses as diverse as family wealth transactions,
contracts, and criminal law. See, e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 56-91, 468-475 (2d ed. 1978) (considering distribution and guardianship); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, HoRNBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 351-55 (1972) (discussing the criminal liability of infants); A. MUELLER & A. RoSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 88-93 (2d ed. 1977)
(considering capacity to contract).
Child labor laws, considered in Mnookin's chapter entitled "State Enforced Limitations on
the Liberty ofMinors," R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1,at 645, are sometimes covered in constitutional
law. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261-68 (9th ed.
1975).
6. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (2d ed.
1976).
7. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATz, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1965).
8. Family law casebooks have focused more on parents than children. In addition to the
books cited in notes 6 and 7 supra, the following casebooks were published after 1960: J. AREEN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (1978); H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC

RELATIONS (2d ed. 1974); H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW (1977); M. PLOSCOwE, H. FOSTER & D.
FREED, FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 1972); P. RYAN & D. GRANFIELD, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1963); W.
WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (3d ed.

1978). Both Professor Areen and Professor Krause consider children at length. Indeed, the second half of Areen's book is entitled "Children, Parents and the State." Krause devotes more than
one-third of his book to children's issues. However, with the exception of C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F.
SANDER, supranote 6, and J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, s.upra note 7, the other books concentrate on
husband-wife relations, expecially marriage and divo/ce. Substantial portions of most of the
books consider custody of children in the context of divorce litigation. Related topics, examined
in part by Mnookin and covered by the other books, are: child placement, including custody and
adoption; inheritance rights of legitimate and illegitimate children; the right to parental support;
and various facets of the child-parent relationship. Of course the extent of coverage varies, but
the family context is consistent.
Krause's book, as well as that of Goldstein and Katz, resembles Mnookin's casebook to some
extent. Krause's work is similar to Mnookin's in that it does examine the issue of children's autonomy. Along with material common to all of the casebooks, Krause includes a discussion of the
necessity of a minor's consent to medical treatment. He also considers the problem of cultural
bias in the juvenile courts--an issue to which Mnookin does not devote sufficient attention-and
discusses the courts' handling of child neglect. Goldstein and Katz discuss issues such as the
determination of a religious faith for the child, the "child's best interest" rubric in foster care and
adoption, and the importance of continuity of affection, blood-ties, name, and race in the custody
determination.
9. The suggestion has been made that:
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An examination of several key chapters of Child,Family andState
demonstrates how its treatment of children and the law differs from
that of traditional family law casebooks. Chapter One advances
Mnookin's model of a triangular relationship between the state, the
family, and the child, and lays the foundation for the consideration of
specific legal problems within that framework in the remainder of the
book. The chapter consists largely of constitutional law cases, interwoven with notes and questions.'" Mnookin's book literally commences
in the womb by considering the competing issues of female
self-determination and the right to life in Roe v. Wade, " the Supreme
Court's landmark abortion decision. The author then turns to the competition between state and parent for dominance over the child. The
courts' allocation of power in this competition is developed through an
examination of cases ranging from the Supreme Court's consideration
of state authority to regulate teaching in the face of parental opposition
in Meyer v. Nebraska'2 to the Court's delineation of parents' authority
to maintain a unique cultural environment for their children in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3 Having illustrated the traditional confrontation between
parents and state for control over children, the author turns to a more
innovative consideration of recent Supreme Court decisions in the last
section of Chapter One, entitled "What Voice for the Child?"
Mnookin first argues that In re Gault14 granted novel rights to children.' 5- He then presents other Supreme Court opinions which recognize that children possess other rights in a variety of contexts. The
treatment of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,'6 describing the free speech rights of children in the public
schools, is particularly thought-provoking. Concluding the chapter by
illustrating this trend in the sensitive area of procreative regulation,
PlannedParenthoodof Central Missouri v. Danforth'7 and Bellotti v.
Bairdi8 communicate graphically the book's concern with the emerging
it has become increasingly difficult to cover much material about children in a basic
family law course. The questions of property, nonmarital relationships, pre-marital contracts and sex roles within marriage have become sufficiently difficult and controversial
that they demand a substantial amount of coverage. In addition, many teachers use
family law as an opportunity to teach interviewing and counselling skills not otherwise
taught in law schools, thus it is often difficult to cover anything about children other than
child custody questions following divorce.
Letter from Professor Michael S. Wald of Stanford Law School to author (October 12, 1978) (on
file with author).
10. See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN, supra note I, at 17-20, 34-37, 67-68, 75-76, 134-37.
11.

410 U.S. 113 (1973), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 4.

12.

262 U.S. 390 (1923), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note I, at 29.

13.
14.

406 U.S. 205 (1972), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 43.
387 U.S. 1 (1967), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 77.

15.

R. MNOOKIN, supra note I, at 107.

16.

393 U.S. 503 (1969), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 127.

17. 428 U.S. 52 (1976), reprintedin R. MNOO0IN, supra note I, at 139.
18. 428 U.S. 132 (1976), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 144.
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fights of children.
Following the innovative and challenging inaugural chapter, the
author applies the framework developed there to six substantive areas
of children's law. The results are often novel and engaging. An example can be found in the stimulating chapter on medical treatment of
children. Here Professor Mnookin's triangular model is presented in
the context of a simultaneous revolution in medicine. Mnookin's discussion of the bilateral conflict between the state and parents over
treatment of children appearing in the Jehovah's Witnesses blood
transfusion cases' 9 is followed by the California Supreme Court's opinion in In re Roger S. 2" in which a trilateral framework was recognized.
The California Supreme Court found in In re Roger S. that "the
liberty interest of minors" poses a significant impediment to the power
of parents to incarcerate children in mental hospitals. 2 The court argued that
[t]he serious consequences attendant upon involuntary commitment of
a minor as a mentally ill or disordered person, and the significant potential for error in diagnosis convinces us that a minor who is mature
enough to participate intelligently in the decision to independently asprocess in the commitment decision must be persert his right to 2due
2
mitted to do so.
Although the court justified this limitation on the authority of the parent in part by reference to the societal interest in supervising the welfare of the child, it ultimately concluded that "no interest of the state or
of a parent sufficiently outweighs the liberty interest of a minor old
enough to independently exercise his right to due process to permit the
parent to deprive him of that right." 23 Thus the California decision
exemplifies the thrust of the book and the focus of the chapter-the
emerging recognition that children have rights in settings formerly
marked by a struggle for dominance between parents and state.
Although Mnookin devotes much attention in this chapter to situations in which the child is ill, the most interesting aspect of the chapter
is its analysis of the child's demand for autonomy in the context of
experimental medicine. The "donation" of children as subjects for operations-frequently where no benefit inures to the child-is questioned through the use of problems, articles from medical journals, case
19. R. MNOOKIN supra note 1, at 359-61.
20. 19 Cal. 3d 921,569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977), reprintedinR. MNooKIN, supra
note 1, at 361.
21. Id at 927, 569 P.2d at 1289, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 301, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supranote
1, at 363.
22. Id at 929, 569 P.2d at 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 303, reprintedinR. MNOOKIN, supra note

1, at 364.
23.

1, at 365.

Id at 931, 569 P.2d at 1292, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 304, reprinted/n R. MlooKIN, supra note
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studies, and opinions. Bonner v. Moran24 and Hart v. Brown 25 are
presented to illustrate the unusual and difficult dilemmas such cases
pose to courts. In Bonner, a fifteen-year-old child consented to a skin
graft arranged by his aunt for the benefit of his cousin.26 The child's
parent had not consented. 27 The court held that such parental approval
was necessary, despite the consent of the child.2 8 Hartv. Brown raised
the important question, not addressed in Bonner, whether the child's
permission is necessary for nonbeneficial surgery. The child in Hart
was seven years old and incapable of giving informed consent. 29 The
court allowed the parents to consent on behalf of the child, emphasizing the special facts of the case: the child's court-appointed guardians
had agreed with the parents' judgment, as had a clergyman and physician who had been consulted. 30 Though these opinions present, on balance, satisfactory judicial resolutions of the particular problems
involved, Mnookin's notes and questions suggest the need for independent and effective representation of the child in the decisionmaking leading to nonbeneficial surgery. Making clear the difficult choices
these hard cases force upon the legal system, Mnookin here raises issues that go beyond the book's central concern with the rights of children and explores the capacity of courts to resolve the fundamental
ethical dilemmas posed by advancements in medical technology. The
result is a chapter as stimulating as any in the book.3 1
Limitations on the liberty of children are considered in the sixth
chapter of the book. In addition to examining such traditional regulations as minimum age requirement§ for drinking and driving, Mnookin
takes a fresh look at child labor laws.3 2 With skillful manipulation of
materials, Mnookin raises new questions about possible anachronisms
caused by previous reforms. The section on child labor is an extended
essay which explores statutory schemes originally designed to protect
children from exploitation in the labor market. Mnookin's presenta24. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 417.
25. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra
note 1, at 421.
26. 126 F.2d at 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 418.
27. Id, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 418.
28. Id at 122, reprintedin R. MNooKIN, supra note 1, at 419.
29. 29 Conn. Supp. at 370, 289 A.2d at 386, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 421-

25.

30.

Id at 375-76, 289 A.2d at 390-91, reprintedin R. MNOOKI,

supra note 1, at 424-25.

31. For additional discussion of medical experimentation with children, see Capron, Legal
ConsiderationsAffecting ClinicalPharmacologicalStudies in Children, CLINICAL RESEARCH 141
(1973); Curran & Beecher, Experimentationin ChildrernA Re-examination of LegalEthicalPrincipies, 10 . AM. MED. AssN. 77 (1969); Ingelfinger, Ethics ofExperiments on Children, 288 NEw
ENO. J. MED. 791 (1973); Katz, Children, Privacy and NontherapeuticExperimentation, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 802 (1975); Lowe, Alexander & Mishkin, Aontherapeutic Research on ChildremxAn EthicalDilemma, 84 J. PEDIATRICS 468 (1974).
32. R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 646-68.
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tion raises the question whether in today's world such regulations may
impede the maturation and autonomy of children.33 His exploration of
the arguments underlying child labor laws and the proposals for reform
of such laws is a high point of the volume.
The appearance of Professor Mnookin's casebook, with its striking
emphasis on children's rights, raises interesting questions about the status of the child in contemporary society. Have the problems of children, isolated in such an illuminating manner by Mnookin, eclipsed
those of the family unit? Are we witnessing a gradual but unmistakable process of children's liberation? Indeed, Mnookin's casebook does
present a number of legal developments which reflect the increasing
independence of the child.
An example can be found in Mnookin's discussion of the manner
in which some states have responded to the problem of parent-child
incompatibility. Family law casebooks typically devote considerable
attention to incompatibilty between spouses. Mnookin's concern, however, is not with interspousal strife. Asking the provocative question
whether children should be able to divorce their parents, 34 Mnookin
presents a recent opinion which gives an affirmative answer. In In re
Snyder,35 the parents of sixteen-year-old Cynthia Nell Snyder sought
her return from a foster home. The daughter had been placed in the
home after arguing successfully to a juvenile court that her relations
with her parents had so deteriorated as to qualify her as "incorrigible."' 36 The finding of incorrigibility allowed the child to leave her parents. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the placement of the
child in a foster home. The court accepted the argument that parent-child incompatibility, based in large part upon the child's antipathy toward her parents, was sufficient grounds for allowing the child to
replace her parents with state-selected guardians.37 Emerging in the
opinion is the development that Mnookin so graphically identifies
throughout the book: the increasing autonomy of the child accompanied by the concomitant weakening of family ties.
A second example of the increasing legal independence of the
child used by Mnookin concerns the right to an abortion. Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,38 the principal case
presented by Mnookin, contains important declarations about the right
33.

R. MNOOKrN, supra note 1, at 655.

34. R. MNooKiN, supra note 1, at 747.
35.
36.

85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 747.
Id at 185, 532 P.2d at 281, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 749.

37.

Id at 187-88, 532 P.2d at 281-82, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 749-50.

38. 428 U.S. 52 (1976), reprinted in R. MNooKIN, supra note 1, at 139. After Danforth,
Mnookin presents Bellotti v. Baird,428 U.S. 132 (1976), reprintedinR. MNOOKIN, supra note 1,at

144, decided on the same day. That case involved a challenge to a state statute which limited a
minor's right to an abortion. The Court remanded the case for certification of questions of statu-
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of a minor to obtain an abortion despite parental disapproval. In Danforth the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a section of a state statute requiring written parental consent for an abortion by unmarried
women under the age of eighteen. 39 The Court stated the general governing principle in simple, forthright language: "Constitutional rights
do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."4 Applying the test of Roe v. Wade,4" the court could not find "any significant
state interest" in allowing a parental veto.42 The minor's constitutional
right to freedom from such restrictions was thus upheld.
While these cases illustrate the increasing recognition of children's
rights, they also contain clear reminders of the halting, limited nature
of this trend. In In re Snyder, Cynthia Snyder was allowed to leave her
family. However, the choice granted to her by the court was not one
between parental authority and complete independence.43 Instead,
Cynthia was to be subject to the supervision of foster parents, with the
state retaining authority to intervene when necessary.44 In this sense,
the minor's autonomy was limited to a choice between masters. Similarly, in the abortion decisions the Court was circumspect in delineating the scope of the minor's rights. In Danforth, the Court noted that it
"long has recognized that the state has somewhat broader authority to
regulate the activities of children than of adults. ' 45 Though the Court
could not find a significant state interest in allowing parents an abolute
veto, it suggested that less obtrusive limitations on the minor's rights
might withstand constitutional scrutiny.4 In Bellotti v. Bairdthe Court
suggested the nature of the state interests which might justify such limitations: "In this case, we are concerned with a statute directed towards
minors, as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks of inability
tory construction to the state supreme court. In the process, the Court made some interesting
observations about the reach of the Danforth holding. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
39. 428 U.S. at 72, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 139.
40. 428 U.S. at 74, reprintedin R. MNOOKUN, supra note 1, at 140-41.
41. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
42. 428 U.S. at 74, reprintedin R. MNOOKrN, supra note 1, at 140.
43. 85 Wash. 2d 182, 187, 532 P.2d 278, 281, reprintedin R. MNooKIN, supra note 1, at 749.
It should also be noted that the "voice of the minor" to which the court responded did not speak
unaided. The court stressed that a psychiatrist selected by the minor's parents had also concluded

that the parent-child relationship had deteriorated substantially. Id The court's emphasis on this
factor leaves unclear how the court would respond if the minor were the only party advocating
separation.
44. Id
45. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976), reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 141.
46. Id The Court stated: 'We emphasize that our holding that Section 3(4) is invalid does

not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy." Id
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to give an informed consent. 47
The emphasis on the increasing legal independence of the child in
Child,Family andState can obscure the tentative character of this development. Use of the casebook may lead to an exaggerated perception
among some students about how far the law has gone in recognizing
the rights of children. 48 However, Mnookin's organization, comments,
and questions go far to counter this misimpression. The trilateral parent-state-child construct introduced early in the book49 is often invoked
in discussing cases and problems.5 0 The discerning reader soon understands that Mnookin never loses sight of the fact that children's rights
are emerging in a legal environment dominated by family and state.
Mnookin skillfully communicates this awareness in his treatment
of Ginsberg v. New York' 1 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com2 These cases were decided within a year of
munity School District."
each other by the Supreme Court. Upholding the right of children to
wear armbands in school, Tinker contains sweeping declarations about
the first amendment rights of minors. The Court made clear that the
right to feedom of speech is one of a child's "fundamental rights which
the state must respect. '53 In the casebook, Tinker is preceded by Ginsberg, a case whose holding and tone are quite different. Ginsberg articulated a variable obscenity standard for minors, determining that
limitations unconstitutional as to adults may be acceptable if applied
only to minors.5 4 The arguments presented in support of its holding
made clear the Court's view of the child as subject to parent-state hegemony. The Court found two interests justifying the challenged statute. The provision was a permissible way for the state to aid parents in
their efforts to protect their children from harmful reading materials.55
In addition, the state's independent interest in protecting the welfare of
minors was furthered by the provision.56 The interests of the children
whose freedom was being restricted were hardly considered. By juxta47.

428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976), reprintedinR. MNOOIN, supra note 1, at 148.

48. The likelihood of this misperception is increased by Mnookin's extensive use of nonlegal
materials. Drawing upon work done in medicine, psychology, sociology, and philosophy,
Mnookin is able to present information and insights not contained in case law. However, a
number of these disciplines have advanced a much more autonomous vision of the child than has
the law. By interspersing such nonlegal materials with cases, Mnookin's book may convey to the
careless reader the misimpression that the law has been as generous in defining the extent of
children's autonomy as have other disciplines.
49. R. MNOOKIN,supra note 1, at 107.
50. See, ag., Professor Mnookin's discussion of parent, state conflict over custody of the
neglected child in R. MNOOKIN, spranote 1, at 495-594.
51. 390 U.S. 629 (1968), reprintedinR. MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 110.
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969), reprintedinR. MNOOKIN, supra note 1,at 127.
53. Id at 511, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, supra note I, at 130.
54. 390 U.S. at 640, reprintedinR_ MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 114.
55. Id at 639, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN,supra note 1,at 113.
56. Id at 640, reprintedinR. MNooKIN, supra note 1, at 113-14.
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posing these cases and exploring their implications in questions,
Mnookin makes clear to the careful reader that the courts promulgating new rights for children are still committed to upholding the traditional authority of parents and states in most respects.
Mnookin is not only aware of the continuing parent and state
dominance over the child, but he also points out the manner in which
these relationships benefit the child. Following the Snyder decision
recognizing a child's limited right to leave her parents, Mnookin
presents a piece arguing that "[b]ecause of its preparatory role, maintenance of the family tradition is in fact a prerequisite to the existence of
a rational and productive individual tradition."57 That children are not
in certain instances sufficiently mature to make informed decisions is a
point Mnookin also recognizes. In the materials following Ginsberg,
Mnookin presents a piece quoting Justice Stewart's succinct statement
of this point in the first amendment context: "A child is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
the First Amendment guarantees. '58 Thus, Mnookin does not embrace
without reservation the emergence of children's autonomy which he
chronicles so well.
Mnookin's ability to pose clearly the dilemmas that arise as this
society grants rights to its young is a major virtue of Child,Family and
State. While emphasizing the law's increasing willingness to recognize
that children have rights, Mnookin subtly reminds the reader of the
inchoate nature of this trend. His questions and comments force the
reader to evaluate the benefits of conceding greater autonomy to children. Used by one willing to think carefully about the complex issues
Mnookin identifies, Child,Family andState provides an excellent foundation for an understanding of children and the law.

57. Hafen, Children'sLiberationandthe New EgalitarianisnvSome ReservationsAboutAbandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 605, 657, reprintedin R. MNOOKIN, Supra

note 1,at 752.
58.

T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 496-97 (1970), reprintedin R.

MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 123.

